This is one of two papers about emergence, reduction and supervenience. It expounds these notions and analyses the general relations between them. The companion paper analyses the situation in physics, especially limiting relations between physical theories.
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Introduction
This is one of a pair of papers that together rebut two philosophical doctrines about emergence. The first doctrine is that emergence is incompatible with reduction. The second is that emergence is supervenience; or more exactly, supervenience without reduction. I will claim that (with some usual meanings of these words!) both doctrines are false. This paper expounds the notions and analyses their general relations. But it sets aside limiting relations between physical theories, especially how in some cases taking a limit of some parameter in one theory, say N → ∞, yields another theory. Such limits will be a topic in the companion paper (Butterfield 2011) . There the main idea will be to exhibit examples that combine emergence and reduction, by deducing the emergent behaviour using a limit of a parameter.
I should first explain what I will mean by the contested terms 'emergence', 'reduction' and 'supervenience' (Section 1.1). Then I will give a prospectus (Section 1.2).
Defining terms
1.1.1 Emergence as novel and robust behaviour; reduction as deduction; supervenience as determination I shall take emergence to mean: properties or behaviour of a system which are novel and robust relative to some appropriate comparison class. Here 'novel' means something like: 'not definable from the comparison class', and maybe 'showing features (maybe striking ones) absent from the comparison class'. And 'robust' means something like: 'the same for various choices of, or assumptions about, the comparison class'. Often these words are made more precise by the fact that the system is a composite. So the idea is that its properties and behaviour are novel and robust compared to those of its component systems, especially its microscopic or even atomic components. I shall also put the idea in terms of theories, rather than systems: a theory describes properties or behaviour which are novel and robust relative to what is described by some other theory with which it is appropriate to compare-often a theory of the system's component parts.
definitions or bridge-principles linking the two theories' vocabularies. This construal will mean that I come close to endorsing the traditional account of Nagel (1961) , despite various objections that have been levelled against it; (details in Section 3).
Finally, 'supervenience' is a much less contested term than the other two. It is taken by all to be a relation between families of properties, of determination (also called 'implicit definability'): the extensions of all the properties in one family relative to a given domain of objects determine the extension of each property in the other family. Besides, this is widely agreed to be a weakening of the usual notion of the second family being definable from the first, which is called 'explicit definability'. (But Section 5.1 will describe circumstances in which it is not a weakening, i.e. in which supervenience collapses to the usual notion.) Since the definitions used in a Nagelian reduction would be of this explicit sort, supervenience is widely taken to be a weakening of Nagelian reduction.
To sum up: my notion of emergence is not "formalist" or "logical"; but my notions of reduction and supervenience are.
Avoiding controversy
I concede that there is already scope for vagueness, subjectivity, and thereby controversy! As regards emergence: What counts as an appropriate comparison class? And for a fixed class, being 'striking' is likely to be subjective. And how many, or how varied, must the choices or assumptions about such a class be so as to yield robustness? Besides, philosophers and logicians recognize various definitions of 'definability'. The variety relates both to metaphysical controversies about the identity of properties, and to logical contrasts between finite and infinitary definability (cf. Sections 3 and 5). These questions reflect the ongoing debate among philosophers over the correct or best definition of emergence, and of its apparent contrary, reduction or reducibility. (Silberstein (2002) is a recent survey of proposals for both emergence and reduction; cf. also Bedau (2003, pp. 157-161) .) For example: philosophers disagree about what counts as explanation; and so they disagree about what it takes for one theory (or something similar, such as a model) to explain or reduce another theory, or model or phenomenon.
But in this paper, these ambiguities and controversies will not be a problem, for three reasons. (1) 'Similarity': My meanings for the contested terms, 'emergence' and 'reduction', will be similar to those of many authors, scientific and philosophical.
(2) 'Clarity': I will not need to claim that my meanings are in some sense the "best" meanings to attach to the terms; for example by being derived from a survey of examples, or by satisfying a list of desiderata. In fact, I doubt that there are such best meanings. As regards 'emergence', this is widely agreed. Many authors begin clearing the ground for their discussion by announcing their understanding of 'emergence': usually stressing, as I do, novel behaviour-though less often its robustness.
Similarly, I doubt that there is a best meaning of 'reduction'. Though I will often disagree with objections made against Nagel's account of reduction (details in Section 3), at the end of the day, I will be willing to say 'what's in a name?'. That is, my heterodox or traditionalist endorsement of Nagel will be in part stipulative: it will be clearer, and convenient, to mean by 'reduction' the comparatively precise relation of deducibility using appropriate definitions or bridge principles.
One reason why this will be clearer and convenient is the obvious one, that it makes supervenience a weakening of reduction (modulo the collapse in Section 5.1). Other reasons will be given in the preamble to Section 3. But in short, they will be a matter of tactics. This paper has limited space and limited scope. So: since I can establish my main claims using my narrow deductive conception of reduction-but without settling on a general account of reduction (or of related topics like explanation, laws and causation), and even without assessing the pros and cons of Nagel's account-I do so. Admittedly, there will be one controversial stance I do adopt. I will reject the multiple realizability argument, developed by authors such as Putnam and Fodor. Here I will endorse a refutation by Sober (1999) , which I believe is decisive and unfairly neglected. But since the multiple realizability argument applies equally to supervenience as to reduction, I will postpone this topic till Section 4.
To sum up: the result of my limited space and scope, and of my postponement, will be that my Section on reduction (Section 3) will be more concerned with formal deductions, less controversial (and mercifully shorter!), than you would nowadays expect for a discussion of reduction.
(3) 'Tension': In any case, my meanings of 'emergence' and 'reduction' are not chosen trickily, just so as to easily attain my aims. To the charge of carefully defining terms so as to immediately secure the desired conclusion, I plead innocent! To explain this, I need to state my aims. I said at the start that I aimed to show that emergence is compatible with reduction (usually considered its contrary), and that emergence is not the same as (what is often called) "mere supervenience", i.e. supervenience without reduction, taken as deduction using appropriate definitions. More positively, the two papers together aim to show that:-(i) Emergence is not in all cases failure of reduction, even in this strong sense of reduction. There are cases combining emergence with reduction-as well as cases of one of these without the other (of course);
(ii) Nor is emergence in all cases mere supervenience (Section 5); nor is it in all cases failure of mere supervenience. In short: we have before us a varied landscape-emergence is independent of these other notions. Thus I submit that my meanings of 'emergence', 'reduction' and 'supervenience' are precise and strong enough to make it worth arguing for these independence claims.
Besides, my meanings of 'emergence' and 'reduction' are in tension with each other: since logic teaches us that valid deduction gives no new "content", how can one ever deduce novel behaviour? (Of course, this tension is also shown by the fact that many authors who take emergence to involve novel behaviour thereby take it to also involve irreducibility.) My answer to this 'how?' question, i.e. my reconciliation, will lie in the use of limits. I have postponed that topic to the companion paper. Suffice it to say here that the idea is that one performs the deduction after taking a limit of some parameter: so the main morals will be that in such a limit there can be novelty, compared with what obtains away from the limit, and that (pace some authors) this should count as reduction, not irreducibility.
To sum up these three reasons, (1) to (3): my meanings of 'emergence' and of 'reduction' are similar enough to other authors' meanings, and clear enough in themselves, and in tension enough with each other, to make it worth arguing that we can often "have our cake and eat it": that there are cases of emergence and reduction. And similarly for emergence's being independent of supervenience: there are cases of emergence without supervenience, and vice versa.
The middle of a spectrum
Note that my construal of emergence falls in the middle of a spectrum. On the one hand, it is more general than various specific (and sometimes speculative) scientific proposals for understanding higher-level or emergent theories or phenomena. In recent decades, these proposals have been drawn from either or both of: (i) a handful of general ideas, including computational intractability, non-linearity, heirarchy, and scaling; and (ii) a handful of proposed paradigms or schemes; e.g. cellular automata or the renormalization group or self-organized criticality. (Simon (1996, Chapter 7) sketches some of these.) Thus I will not incorporate any of these ideas and paradigms in my notion of emergence. (However, of the companion paper's four main examples, one example will involve scaling, and another the renormalization group.)
This exclusion is not just a matter of it being useful for philosophical discussion to keep the notion of emergence general; (nor just of my ignorance of most of these ideas and paradigms!). I also admit to a curmudgeonly scepticism about the prospects of a science of emergent phenomena being unlocked by some small handful of ideas. That is: I doubt that any such handful can be the key to understanding all emergent phenomena.
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But I should also make a less curmudgeonly response to the general ideas (i) and proposed paradigms (ii). Some philosophers have in recent years agreed that supervenience is too weak to characterize emergence, and have then proposed that an idea or paradigm of kinds (i) or (ii) does characterize emergence; (details in Section 4.2). This prompts the following response. As I said in Section 1.1.2, I agree that emergence is not supervenience, though for reasons of my own (Section 5). And I am not essentialist about how to use 'emergence'. So I can be pluralist and say that, for example, computational intractability in cellular automata, gives an acceptable sense of 'emergence'. (In fact, this is the proposal of Bedau (1997).)
My construal of emergence is also weaker than some philosophical (as against scientific) proposals. Authors such as Bishop and Hendry have advocated in many papers-e.g. Bishop (2008, especially Sections 1 and 4.2) and Hendry (2010, especially Sections 2 and 4)-doctrines of 'top-down causation' according to which higher-level entities or properties 'have a causal influence on the flow of events at the lower levels ... from which they emerge' (Kim, 1999, p. 143) . I myself reject such doctrines; (and not just because of uneasiness about the notion of causation in general: Butterfield 2007, Section 2). But as mentioned in Section 1.1.2, I can in this paper set such doctrines aside, since I can establish my claims without tangling with the notion of causation.
So much for how my construal of emergence is more general than various proposals. On the other hand, it is more specific than the idea of solving a problem by finding an appropriate 'good' set of variables (quantities) and-or an appropriate 'good' approximation scheme. I admit that this idea is all-important: it is endemic in science, and a great deal of creativity (skill, imagination-and luck!) can be required to find good variables and-or good approximation schemes. I also admit that it is natural here to talk of 'emergence': to say that the good variables, and-or their behaviour, 'emerge'-perhaps, emerge under the conditions that the good approximation scheme applies. I also admit that the topic of good variables and-or approximation schemes is philosophically rich-and philosophers have addressed it (often under the headings of 'idealization' and 'modelling').
But it is clearly a more general topic than novel and robust behaviour. One sees this if one tries to list some of the considerations that are relevant to goodness. In short: good variables are often a matter of one or more of: being few in number and autonomous, i.e. having uncoupled equations; being easily calculated with; being suited to the given problem; helping insight, e.g. by being suggestive for another theory. A similar list might be drawn up for approximation schemes. Thus, goodness is surely a logically weaker and more heterogeneous concept than emergence construed as novel and robust behaviour. Presumably, the closest link between them is that autonomous equations make for robustness, in the sense that these equations' variables have values (and over time: the equations have solutions) that are the same whatever the values of many other variables.
I think it a merit of my construal of emergence that it steers this middle course. Surely it would hardly be news if I told you that an idea so specific as cellular automata, or an idea so general as good variables and approximation-schemes, was compatible with reduction.
Prospectus
As I said in Section 1.1.2, my aim is to show that emergence is independent of both (a) reduction and (b) supervenience. I spell out this aim in Section 2. In Section 3, I argue for (a), the independence from reduction, though looking ahead a little to the companion paper's treatment of limits, and its physical examples. And this independence holds, with a strong understanding both of 'emergence' (i.e. 'novel and robust behaviour') and of 'reduction' (viz. deduction using appropriate definitions). In Section 5, I argue for (b), the independence from supervenience-having first explained and discussed supervenience in Section 4.
Of my various subsidiary claims, let me state here four main ones. Unsurprisingly in such a well-worked area of philosophy, each is shared with some other authors:-(i): I defend the traditional Nagelian conception of reduction (Section 3); (cf. the authors listed in footnote 2);
(ii): I deny that the multiple realizability argument causes trouble for reductions, or "reductionism" (Section 4); (cf. Sober 1999); (iii): I stress the collapse of supervenience into deduction via Beth's theorem (Section 5.1); (cf. Hellman and Thompson 1975) ; (iv): I adapt some known examples to show supervenience without emergence and vice versa; (for supervenience without emergence, my examples are from Hellman and Thompson (1977) ; and for the opposite, I follow several authors' citation of quantum entanglement).
So let me once more sum up my claims. Emergence is not in all cases failure of reduction, even in the strong sense of deduction using appropriate definitions; (Section 3). Nor is emergence in all cases supervenience; nor is it in all cases failure of supervenience (Section 5). In short: we have before us a varied landscape-emergence is independent of these two notions.
Emergence is independent of reduction and supervenience
In this Section, I spell out some assumptions and jargon (Section 2.1), and the eight failures of logical implication that my claims of independence entail (Section 2.2). Of these eight, most of the interest lies in three cases: (a) emergence combined with reduction, (b) supervenience without emergence and (c) emergence without supervenience. My defence of case (a) will depend on examples of limiting relations between theories which I have postponed to the companion paper. But the general shape of case (a) will be clear from Section 3. Cases (b) and (c) will be covered by Section 5 (Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 respectively).
Assumptions and jargon
It will be clearest to take each of the three notions, emergence, reduction and supervenience, as a relation between theories. For the most part, I shall understand a 'theory', as usual in logic, as a set of sentences of an interpreted language closed under logical consequence.
This is likely to trigger any (or all!) of three complaints. The first is specific to my topic; the second comes from general philosophy of science; the third from metaphysics.
(1) 'Theories?': It is wrong to describe all cases of emergence, reduction and supervenience, as a relation between theories, so understood. (For a glimpse of the alternatives, cf. the Figures in Silberstein (2002, p. 89-90) .) (2) 'Syntax?': Whatever one's account of emergence, reduction and supervenience, this understanding of theories, viz. the traditional syntactic view, has been refuted in favour of the semantic view that a scientific theory is a set of models.
(3) 'Properties?': In metaphysics, supervenience is almost always defined as a relation between two sets of properties, not as a relation between theories. So: what justifies my change?
My reply is, in short, that I reject (2) and (3), and this prompts me to ignore (1) . There are three main points to make against (2) and (3); the second and third will become clearer in Section 5.
(i): The syntactic view is more flexible than is often admitted. The theory's language need not be formalized, nor even finitary; nor need the underlying logic be first-order. I contend that with this liberal construal, the syntactic view can describe perfectly well the phenomena in scientific theorizing that advocates of the semantic view tout as the merits of models. Indeed, this is hardly surprising. For to present a theory as a set of models, you have to use language, usually (at least in part) by saying what is true in the models; and on almost any conception of model, a model makes true any logical consequence of whatever it makes true.
(ii): I said that I understood 'theory' syntactically 'for the most part' ! For in Section 5 I will need the idea of a class of models that is not the set of models of a given (syntactic, indeed first-order) theory. And I need this idea, not just for one point among many, but for a crucial point about supervenience that the literature about supervenience has woefully neglected. This leads to (iii).
(iii): Turning to (3), there is less dispute here than might appear. In short, the supervenience literature distinguishes local and global supervenience, and we will see reason to prefer the latter notion-which is tantamount to my tactic of taking supervenience as a relation between theories. Details in Section 4.3.
These points, (i) to (iii), suffice to answer (2) and (3). But I agree that they do not refute (1), especially as regards emergence. I must concede that perhaps some cases of emergence, or reduction or supervenience (even in my senses), are not happily described as a relation between theories, even liberally construed. I can only say that I know of no such cases, but hope that my claims could be carried over to them.
So I now propose to argue that these three relations between theories, emergence, reduction and supervenience, are mutually independent. I will confine myself to arguing for logical independence, i.e. for these relations not logically implying each other (and likewise, their negations). Agreed, you might complain that this is a weaker and easier aim than arguing for some sort of nomological independence. For even if I show that a logical implication fails, e.g. from emergence to non-reduction (by showing a case of emergence and reduction), you might reply that some weaker, e.g. nomological, implication might yet hold. That is, you might say that emergence subject to some realistic constraints, e.g. subject to some laws, excludes reduction, i.e. implies non-reduction. Fair comment. But in the debate about emergence "vs." reduction, with its several different usages and controversies, we will have enough work to do, just to establish logical independence. Consider the open sea of considerations bearing on how you should choose your "realistic constraints": sufficient unto the day is the work thereof! I turn to the jargon about the relations of reduction and supervenience. The traditional philosophical jargon is that one theory T 1 reduces to, or is reducible to, another T 2 if, roughly speaking, T 1 can be shown to be part of T 2 . And the Nagelian tradition treats this as T 1 being derived from T 2 , subject perhaps to further constraints, e.g. about the derivation counting an explanation of its conclusion; (more details in Section 3).
The first thing to say is that we must beware of the conflicting, indeed converse, jargon common in physics! The physics jargon is that in such a case, it is T 2 that reduces to T 1 (typically in some limit of some parameter of T 2 ). The idea is of course that 'reduces to' means 'simplifies to': for example, physicists say that special relativity reduces to Newtonian mechanics as the speed of limit c tends to infinity.
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I will adopt the philosophers' jargon. But to avoid confusion between T 1 and T 2 , I will use mnemonic subscripts. For the reducing theory, I will use b: 'b' is for bottom/basic/best; 'bottom' and 'basic' connoting microscopic and fundamental, and 'best' connoting a successor theory. And for the reduced theory, I will use t: 't' is for top/tangible/tainted; 'top' and 'tangible' connoting macroscopic and observable, and 'tainted' connoting a predecessor theory. So to sum up: I will follow the philosopher, saying that a theory T b ≡ T bottom/basic/best reduces T t ≡ T top/tangible/tainted ; and that T t reduces to, or is reducible to, T b ; whereas a physicist would say that T b reduces to T t (typically in some limit of a parameter). Thus the broad picture is that T t is reduced to T b by:
(i) being shown to be logically deducible from T b , usually together with some judiciously chosen definitions; (details in Section 3.1); and maybe also (ii) satisfying some further constraints e.g. about explanation; (details in Section 3.2).
Once the relation of deducibility, in (i) above, is made precise, there is an apparent weakening of it, which in logic is called implicit definability and in philosophy is called supervenience (or determination). Roughly speaking, it is deducibility, with the allowance of definitions that are infinitely(!) long. But it turns out to be a delicate matter whether this allowance really secures any extra generality, i.e. whether supervenience is in fact weaker (more general) than (i)'s deducibility. This point is well-known in logic (under the name 'Beth's theorem', proven in 1953); and will support my reconciliation of emergence and reduction. But it has been woefully neglected in the philosophical literature about supervenience. More details in Section 5.1.2.
Finally, concerning jargon: taking emergence to be a relation between theories, I will say that T t is emergent from T b . And 'logical independence' will mean 'failure of all implications'. More precisely, propositions p and q are logically independent if all four truth-combinations are possible. That is: p does not imply q, so that p&¬q is possible; nor does ¬p imply q, so that ¬p&¬q is possible; and so on for the other two cases. (In yet another jargon: the distinctions, p vs. ¬p, and q vs. ¬q, cut across one another.)
Eight implications fail
Combining these bits of jargon: for emergence to imply reduction would require that for all theories T t , T b , if T t is emergent from T b , then T t is reduced to T b ; and so on for the other three putative implications relating emergence and reduction; and for the four putative implications relating emergence and supervenience.
Thus I claim that all eight implications fail. This claim is less complex, and less contentious, than it might first appear, for two reasons; (and not just because logical independence is weak, compared with some sort of nomological independence!).
First: while I take emergence as an informal concept (viz. novel and robust behaviour; Section 1.1), I take reduction, and so also its weakening, supervenience, as a formal concept, viz. deducibility. That is: I will abjure (for reasons given in Section 3.2.1) the further constraints mentioned in (ii) of Section 2.1. This informal-formal contrast makes it easier to break the implications.
Second: some of the eight cases are very straightforward, either because (i) they are obvious, or because (ii) they follow from other cases; as follows. Let us write E, R and S as an obvious notation.
As to (i): Of course, emergence and reduction are usually regarded as mutually exclusive, so cases of R&¬E (i.e. two theories where T t is reduced to T b , but T t is not emergent from T b ), and E&¬R are unsurprising. Besides, theories about unrelated topics will provide cases of ¬E&¬R. So for emergence and reduction, the only surprising case I need to establish is: E&R, i.e. two theories where T t is reduced to, but also emergent from, T b . I address this in Section 3; though as announced, some of my defence is postponed to the companion paper, with its examples from physics.
As to (ii): In general, supervenience is a weakening of reduction: if T t is reduced to T b , then T t supervenes on T b . So a case of E&R is ipso facto a case of E&S, and thus shows that emergence does not exclude supervenience. Also: if emergence (or its negation) implied reduction, it would imply supervenience; and (equivalently but more relevantly), if emergence (or its negation) does not imply supervenience, it a fortiori cannot imply reduction. And I shall argue that indeed emergence does not imply supervenience; (nor of course does its negation).
This possibility, E&¬S, is worth emphasising, and not just because it implies that E&¬R is also possible. And similarly, the other possibility, ¬E&S, is worth emphasising. For each of them refutes a widespread philosophical proposal about emergence: viz. that emergence is precisely "mere supervenience", i.e. supervenience that is not reduction. Agreed: since 'emergence' is vague, and philosophers are at liberty to tie it down as they see fit, this doctrine is by no means a consensus. But it is at least worth showing that for my meaning of emergence, as novel and robust behaviour, it fails. Details will be in Section 5.2. For the moment, I just note that since theories about two unrelated topics will provide cases of ¬E&¬S, and cases of E&R also establish E&S, it follows that for emergence and supervenience, I only need to establish two cases: E&¬S, and ¬E&S.
It follows from (i) and (ii) that the three cases I need to establish are: E&R, E&¬S, and ¬E&S. As I mentioned, an idea common to all the cases will be that novelty and robustness are informal, non-logical, ideas, while I take reduction and supervenience as formal ideas: so it is less surprising that the distinction, emergence vs. non-emergence, cuts across reduction vs. non-reduction, and across supervenience vs. non-supervenience.
Emergence vs. reduction? No!
The main claim of my 'No!' is that a theory T t can describe novel and robust behaviour, while being reduced to an appropriate theory T b : that there are cases of E&R. Most of this Section is devoted to this. This will lead at the end of the Section to E&¬R.
Again I admit that I will emphasise a logical, and so "cut and dried", conception of reduction as deduction using judiciously chosen adjoined definitions. This will make my E&R claim less contentious than it might seem. For (as I mentioned in Section 2.1) philosophers often take reduction to require more than deduction. They propose further constraints e.g. about explanation, which in some cases amount to a prohibition of novel behaviour, so that reduction indeed excludes emergence in my sense.
5 (With such a prohibition in force, the issue of robustness does not arise.)
Nevertheless it is worth articulating cases of E&R, where R represents a deductive conception of reduction, for three reasons. The first two are easy to state. The third arises from an objection to the second, and will be a matter of limiting this paper's scope, and of dividing the philosophical labour between this Section and Section 4.
First: articulating these cases shows that the power of reduction, i.e. deduction, is stronger than commonly believed. Second: it shows that philosophers' concerns about which further constraints reduction should satisfy tend to put the emphasis in the wrong place. It is after all just a matter of words whether to call a deduction of novel behaviour a reduction (because of the deduction) or not (because of the novelty). What matters, scientifically and indeed conceptually, is that you have made the deduction: your brick for the rising edifice of unified science! A philosopher might object to this second reason that it equivocates-and that one disambiguation is false and anti-philosophical. Agreed, one can define words as one sees fit, and a deduction of novel behaviour is a scientific achievement. But that in no way shows that philosophers' concerns about further constraints on reduction are mis-directed. For one of the tasks of philosophy of science is to assess how well integrated our theories are. Indeed: are they integrated enough in terms of notions like explanation and the identity of theoretical entities or properties, that taken together they merit the metaphor 'rising edifice', rather than 'shambolic patchwork' ?! However one uses 'reduction' and other words, philosophers should assess how deductive connections between theories relate to notions like explanation and the identity of entities or properties.
I agree. But I will nevertheless emphasise reduction as deduction, and downplay these notions, for two reasons. First, as I said in (2) of Section 1.1.2: this tactic is partly a matter of this paper's limited space, and limited scope. These notions, and their role (if any) in reduction, are beset by controversies I have no space to address. Besides, my scope is limited. In particular, I do not urge that all known examples of emergence are also examples of reduction; and I do not need to take a position in these controversies, nor to settle on a general account of reduction. (But as mentioned in footnote 2, I favour the Nagel-Schaffner account, not its 'New Wave' critics.) Second: this tactic is partly a mere matter of dividing labour between this Section and Section 4. It will be clearer to first treat reduction in logical terms, and to postpone these controversial notions till we discuss supervenience in Section 4. That is hardly surprising: since (as I mentioned) supervenience is a weakening of reduction's core notion of deducibility, these notions also loom large in discussing supervenience. Besides, we will see this connection to supervenience already in Section 3.2.1, where we return to the further constraints that might be required of reduction.
So I turn to details about reduction as deduction (Section 3.1). These details will lead us back to the further constraints (Section 3.2).
Definitional extensions
Definition and comments
Recall the basic idea that one theory T t is reduced to another T b by being shown to be a part of T b . The notion of definitional extension makes this idea precise. The syntactic conception of theories immediately gives a notion of T t being a part of T b , viz. when T t 's theorems are a subset of the T b 's. (This is called T t being a sub-theory of T b .) However, one needs to avoid confusion that can arise from the same predicate (or other non-logical symbol) occurring in both theories, but with different intended interpretations. This is usually addressed by taking the theories to have disjoint non-logical vocabularies. Then one defines T t to be a definitional extension of T b , iff one can add to T b a set D of definitions, one for each of T t 's non-logical symbols, in such a way that T t becomes a sub-theory of the augmented theory T b ∪ D. That is: In the augmented theory, we can prove every theorem of T t . This is the core idea of Nagelian reduction, with the definitions being called 'bridge laws' (or 'bridge principles' or 'correspondence rules').
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This prompts five logical comments, in roughly ascending order of specificity. For most of these comments, the theory's language need not be formalized, nor even finitary; nor need the underlying logic be first-order. But we shall have to be more specific when we discuss supervenience in Section 5, especially the conditions under which it collapses in to definitional extension; cf. Section 5.1. And as I explained in this Section's preamble, some controversial notions such as explanation and the identity of properties will be for the most part postponed to Sections 3.2 and 4. For example, I will take a definition of a predicate P to be a statement that P is co-extensive with an open sentence (cf. (3) below). I will not here consider whether the open sentence must be short and-or conceptually unified; nor will I consider over how large a set of interpretations of the language ("possible worlds") the co-extension must hold. But of course I agree that these issues of how brief or unified, and of how modally strong, such a definition needs to be are central to discussions of reduction, explanation and the identity of properties.
(1): Choosing definitions: The definitions must of course be judiciously chosen, with a view to securing the theorems of T t . And it can take a lot of creativity (skill, imaginationand luck!) to frame such definitions: recall from Section 1.1 the creativity in finding good variables and good approximation schemes.
(2): Allowing long definitions and deductions: There is no requirement that the definitions of T t 's terms, or deductions of its theorems, be short. A definition or deduction might be a million pages long, and never formulated by us slow-witted humans. So when in this Section and my later examples (e.g. Section 3.1.2), I praise the power of deduction, I am in part celebrating how brief, and so how humanly comprehensible, many such definitions and deductions are. For informal yet mathematized theories, this brevity is sometimes won by having compact and powerful notation; the classic example is Leibniz's dy/dx notation for the calculus. For formalized theories the brevity is sometimes won by giving T b a rich set of operations for constructing definitions (e.g. including limit operations) and a correspondingly strong underlying logic to sustain deductions. This is illustrated by (3) and (4).
(3): Definition as co-extension: The core idea of a definition is that it is a statement, for a predicate, of co-extension; and for a singular term, of co-reference. Thus a definition of a primitive predicate P of T t will be a universally quantified biconditional with P on the left hand side stating that P is co-extensive with a right hand side that is a compound predicate (open sentence) φ of T b built using such operations as Boolean connectives and quantifiers. Thus if P is n-place, the definition is: (∀x 1 )...(∀x n )(P (x 1 , ..., x n ) ≡ φ(x 1 , ..., x n )). This scheme can be extended in logic textbooks' usual way to give definitions of individual constants and function symbols, viz. by analysing them in terms of predicates, using Russellian descriptions.
Agreed, this core idea is limited in three respects, which have made some philosophers doubt that it is useful for understanding reduction in science. I take up two of these respects in (4) and (5). The third, I mentioned just before (1): to secure the identity of properties, we surely need not just actual co-extension, but co-extension in a large set of "possible worlds". I take this up in Sections 3.2 and 4.
(4): Getting new objects: But the scheme in (3) does not extend the domain of quantification, while the objects (systems) described by T t often seem distinct from those of T b . As I see matters, this is addressed by three familiar tactics, which are often combined together, and which we can dub, in order: 'theoretical identification', 'logical construction' and 'curly brackets'.
Theoretical identification: What seems so might, surprisingly, not be so. The reduction might identify objects of T t with some of T b . A standard example is Maxwell's theoretical identification of light with electromagnetic waves; (e.g. Sklar 1967, p. 118; Nagel 1979, p. 368) .
Logical construction: We might be willing to give up what seems so. That is: we might accept the reduction's offer of logical constructions in T b as replacements for the objects in T t . To give a convincing example, one of course has to imagine people's views before they were persuaded of the replacement. For example: imagine Kronecker saying that God gave us the integers, and then accepting Frege's or Russell's reduction as a logical construction or replacement of them. This leads to the third tactic.
Curly brackets: Set theory provides a famously powerful way to define (should we say create or discover?!) objects with a formal structure appropriate for well-nigh any theoretical role in a mathematical or scientific theory.
(5): Functional definitions and multiple realizability: Definitional extensions, and thereby Nagelian reduction, can perfectly well accommodate what philosophers call 'functional definitions'. These are a kind of definition of a predicate or other non-logical symbol (or in ontic, rather than linguistic, jargon: of a property, relation etc.) that are secondorder, i.e. that quantify over a given base-set of properties and relations. The idea is best explained by the philosophically familiar example of functionalism in the philosophy of mind.
Functionalism holds that each mental property (or relation), e.g. the property of being in pain, can be defined by its place in a certain pattern of relations (typically, causal andor lawlike relations) between various physical properties and-or their instances. So a first guess for a functional definition of 'being in pain' might be: 'the property of an animal that is typically caused by damage to its tissues and typically causes aversive behaviour'. But functionalists emphasize that this definiens is likely to have different referents in different varieties of animal; and all the more likely, for varieties with disparate nervous systems, e.g. a mollusc, an octopus and a human. So they propose that 'being in pain', as a predicate expressing the common property, should be defined by quantifying over these different referents. Adjusting our first guess, this would give the definiens: 'the property of an animal of having some physical property that is typically caused by damage to its tissues and typically causes aversive behaviour'.
Some jargon: the definition is called a 'functional definition', and pain a 'functional property' because it is not only second-order but involves a pattern of causal and lawlike relations; such a pattern is called a 'functional role'; the different physical properties in the different varieties of animal are called 'realizers' or 'realizations' of pain; and the fact that there are various such properties is called 'multiple realizability'.
So much by way of explaining functional definitions and their associated jargon. It remains to make three points about them.
(i): It is evident that a definitional extension can incorporate functional definitions, for two reasons. First, as I said at the start of this Subsection, the underlying logic need not be first-order; so if you wish you can reflect the second-order status of the definiendum by using a second-order logic. Secondly, you can instead keep to a first-order logic by treating properties as values of first-order variables, and (very probably) also using the powerful apparatus of set theory (cf. 'Curly brackets' in (4) above). For example, one of the definitive expositions of functionalism (applied not just to mind) adopts this latter strategy (Lewis 1970, p. 80 ; also e.g. Loar 1981, pp. 46-56) .
(ii): I have so far talked about two "levels": a base-set of properties and relations, and second-order properties and relations-in my example, the physical and the mental. But we should no doubt distinguish many such levels: both as regards the mind-matter relation, and in other examples, such as the relation of physics to chemistry, and even within physics, such as the relation of nuclear physics to atomic physics, or molecular physics to mesoscopic physics. And between most, or even all, pairs of adjacent levels, there will no doubt be cases of multiple realizability. So for a theory T t at a higher level to be shown to be a definitional extension of one at a lower level will require a succession of functional definitions. As a result, the class of objects (in our example: animals) across which there is a common realizer in the sense of the bottom-level taxonomy of properties, is likely to be small. In general, all we can expect is that this class will be the intersection of the various varieties defined at the various levels. Returning to (i)'s concern with a formal approach's choice of logic: to cope with a succession of functional definitions, and avoid logics of correspondingly higher order, one would no doubt adopt (i)'s second strategy, i.e. first-order logic plus set-theory.
(iii): Some philosophers think that multiple realizability provides an argument against reduction. The leading idea is that the definiens of a multiply realizable property shows it to be too "disjunctive" to be suitable for scientific explanation, or to enter into laws. And some philosophers think that multiple realizability prompts a non-Nagelian account of reduction; even suggesting, pace (i), that definitional extensions cannot incorporate functional definitions. Both these lines of thought have adherents in philosophy of mind and in philosophy of physics. For example, in philosophy of mind: Kim calls Nagelian reduction 'philosophically empty' and 'irrelevant', because Nagelian bridge laws are 'brute unexplained primitives '; (1999, p. 134; 2006, p. 552; and similarly in other works: 1998, pp. 90-97; 2005, pp. 99-100) . Compare also Causey's requirement that the bridge-laws express attribute-identities (1972, p. 412-421 ). Kim's own account, called a 'functional model of reduction', takes reduction to include (a) functional definitions of the higher-level properties P etc. and (b) a lower-level description of the (variety-specific) realizers of P etc., and of how they fulfill the functional roles spelt out in (a). An example in philosophy of physics: Batterman agrees that multiple realizability spells trouble for Nagel, and that Kim's model is not Nagelian; and he applauds it, though with a reservation about how to explain features common across different varieties of realizer; (2002, pp. 65, 67, 70, 71-74 respectively) .
latter occurs very often: as is clear from the non-mental examples in points (ii) and (iii) below, and as is often remarked in the literature (e.g. Needham 2009, p. 105, p. 107) .
As (i) and (ii) suggest, I wholly reject both these lines of thought. Multiple realizability gives no argument against definitional extension; nor even against stronger notions of reduction like Nagel's, that add further constraints additional to deducibility, e.g. about explanation. That is: I believe that Nagelian reduction, even including such constraints, is entirely compatible with multiple realizability. This was shown very persuasively by Sober (1999) . And for critiques of Kim in particular, cf. Marras (2002, pp. 235-237, 240-247) , Rueger (2006, pp. 338-342) and Needham (2009, pp. 104-108) . But as announced in this Section's preamble, I postpone this rebuttal till I discuss supervenience in Section 4, specifically Section 4.1.1. For the controversy applies equally to supervenience as to reduction. Here let me just sum up by saying that I see no tension between Nagelian reduction and the fact of multiple realizability, with its consequent need for functional definitions.
Examples and morals
So much by way of logical comments about definitional extensions. For us, the important point is that there are many examples of definitional extensions in physics, especially if in line with (2)- (4) of Section 3.1.1, we give T b a suitably strong logic and-or set theory so as to "maximize its deductive reach". Besides, the definitions and deductions that secure the definitional extension are remarkably brief and comprehensible.
Examples arise in almost any case where there is a deduction of one physical theory from another. And there are many such. Agreed, 'physical theory' is sometimes taken so broadly, e.g. 'wave optics' or 'classical thermodynamics', that theories are so complex and open-ended (and inter-related) as to be hardly formalized and hardly deducible one from another. But examples abound once one takes 'theory' to be specific enough.
And here, 'enough' need not mean 'very' ! There are striking examples of one general theory being deduced from another. Consider equilibrium classical statistical mechanics for a strictly isolated system, with the postulate of the microcanonical measure on the energy hypersurface. It is a definitional extension of the classical mechanics of the microscopic constituents, once we use an underlying logic strong enough to express calculus of many variables. (For the microcanonical measure is explicitly definable from the phase space's Lebesque measure and the gradient of the Hamiltonian.)
This example also illustrates two morals which will be important in what follows. The first is that claims of deducibility are of course sensitive to exactly which theories are being considered. Thus I concede that: (i) equilibrium classical statistical mechanics is sometimes taken to include the ergodic hypothesis, roughly to the effect that the system's state gets arbitrarily close to any point in the energy hypersurface, since this seems necessary for justifying phase-averaging; and (ii) notoriously, the ergodic hypothesis is not deducible from the general microscopic mechanics-though it does follow if we add various more specific assumptions. So it is a case of swings and roundabouts: we just have to define precisely our T b and T t . This point is very simple, but it will recur: first in Section 3.2, then in Section 5.2, and often in my examples in the companion paper.
The second moral is more positive. This example illustrates two successes of 'reduction as deduction' which are general: indeed, endemic to both classical and quantum physics. Each is a general and surprising simplicity about how to describe composites in terms of their components, and each will be prominent in the companion paper's examples. The first is about states, the second about forces:- [1] : The rules for defining a composite system's state-space and its quantities are very uniform. In particular, for state-spaces we use: Cartesian products in classical physics; tensor products in quantum theory).
[2]: There are no fundamental forces that come into play only when the number of bodies (or particles, or degrees of freedom) exceeds some number, or when the bodies, particles etc. enter into certain configurations, or more generally, states. To put the point more positively: both quantum and classical physics postulate only two-body forces.
In the practice of physics, [1] and [2] are so widespread and familiar that we tend to take them for granted. Certainly they are hardly mentioned in the philosophy of science's literature on reduction.
9 But they are both contingent, and pieces of amazing good fortune for physical enquiry. They will also be important for my argument that emergence is independent of supervenience; cf. Section 5.2.2.
To sum up this eulogy for reduction as deduction: Although deducing real-life theories from one another is hard (cf. comment (1)), there have been some outstanding successes in physics, especially after 1850, when the development of many rich physical theories could be coupled to the powerful tools of modern logic and set theory.
A final comment: these successes also reflect the extraordinary unity of nature. I will not try to make this precise. But think, for example, of quantum theory's explanation of chemical bonding, as in footnote 9; or the cosmic applicability of the periodic table discovered by terrestrial chemistry; or the applicability in so many kinds of dynamics of least-action principles. This unity is, so far as we can tell, contingent; but it is very striking and, for human enquiry, fortunate. Indeed, we are nowadays sufficiently confident of such unity that research programmes aiming to reveal disunity are often heterodox.
But by 'heterodox' I do not mean to suggest 'crankish' or 'incredible'. Here are two recent examples which, involving the high talents of a Nobel prize-winner, have the salutary effect of showing something my eulogy has ignored: the scientific (rather than philosophical) importance of establishing a failure of reduction. Thus consider:
(i) Prigogine's programme to find novel time-irreversible laws in order to better explain irreversible phenomena in thermal physics;
(ii) Leggett's prize-winning work on superfluid helium was motivated by his expecting that the phenomena could not be explained by orthodox quantum mechanics-he believed it would need to be modified by admitting new forces, i.e. a quantum analogue of Broad's configurational forces, as in footnote 9. McLaughlin says, this was a reasonable conjecture. He goes on to claim that it was refuted by the development of quantum chemistry; but this claim has been disputed, e.g. by Scerri (2007, pp. 920-925) . Point [1] , on the other hand, seems to go un-mentioned in the philosophical literature.
Agreed: in example (i), the jury is still out, and most of its members are sceptical; while in example (ii), orthodox quantum mechanics could explain the phenomena. So these are indeed examples of heterodoxy; and so they are testimony to how widespread is reduction, and to the unity of nature.
Philosophical criticisms of reduction as deduction
Agreed, Section 3.1's eulogy for reduction as deduction did not mention deducing novelty and robustness. So it does not show the compatibility of emergence and reduction, my case E&R. Completing that task must wait for the examples in the companion paper (2011). But an important part of the task is now just around the corner. For-changing the metaphor-it is just the other side of the coin, for a point I already made in Section 2.1 and the preamble to Section 3: viz. philosophers' tendency to require reduction to obey further constraints, e.g. about explanation or property-identity, apart from deduction. As we shall see, Nagel himself concurred.
Deducibility is too weak
Thus philosophers have said that even if T t is a definitional extension of T b , there can be non-formal aspects of T t that are not encompassed by (are not part of) the corresponding aspects of T b ; and that, at least in some cases, these aspects seem essential to T t 's functioning as a scientific theory. Of course, philosophers disagree about exactly what these aspects are! Some stress metaphysics, some epistemology. Thus one metaphysical aspect concerns the identity of properties. Even though every primitive predicate of T t is co-extensive with a compound predicate of T b (cf. (3) of Section 3.1.1), maybe, at least in some cases, T t 's properties are different from those of T b , including its compound properties. And one epistemological aspect concerns explanation: maybe T t provides explanations that are not encompassed by T b . And similarly for other epistemological aspects, e.g. heuristics for modelling.
This tendency is long-established, and endorsed by the best authorities. Thus Nagel himself (1961, pp. 358-363) adds to the core idea of definitional extension some informal conditions, mainly motivated by the idea that the reducing theory T b should explain the reduced theory T t ; and following Hempel, he conceives explanation in deductivenomological terms. Thus he says, in effect, that T b reduces T t iff: (i): T t is a definitional extension of T b ; and (ii): In each of the definitions of T t 's terms, the definiens in the language of T b must play a role in T b ; so it cannot be, for example, a heterogeneous disjunction.
Some philosophers have objected that Nagel's proposal does not secure what was needed: that the definitions (bridge laws) should be property-identities and-or should be explained. (Cf. the references to Kim and Causey in (5)(iii), at the end of Section 3.1.1.) Other philosophers are much closer to Nagel; e.g. Sklar (1967, pp. 119-123) , Nickles (1973, pp. 190-194) .
I incline to the latter view-but I do not need to assess this debate. For my purposes, the main point is this: although I have presented reduction as deduction, I can perfectly well concur with this tendency to add further contraints. As I said in the preamble of Section 3, the apparent conflict is in part just a matter of words. That is: one can interpret 'reduction' as one theory being part of (or encompassed by) another in a strong sense. Then there will be fewer reductions. And in particular, a reduced T t will not exhibit novelty relative to T b , and so reduction will exclude emergence in my sense. But on the other hand, one can-I do-interpret 'reduction' in a weaker sense, requiring only deduction (as spelt out in (1)- (5) of Section 3.1.1). Then there will be more reductions; and the door is open to cases of reduction and novelty, even reduction and emergence (i.e. both novelty and robustness). Indeed, the door is wide open. For the very same considerations, e.g. about the deduced theory T t having novel properties (or to take the other example: about T t 's autonomous explanations) that prompt the tradition to conclude 'Here is no reduction', prompt someone like me to say 'Here is reduction, i.e. deduction, with novelty or autonomy etc.'.
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So much, for the moment, by way of arguing for emergence with reduction, for my case E&R. To complete the argument, I would have to say more about novelty; and to discuss robustness, which this Section has ignored. But I postpone that until the companion paper's examples, which will show how one can get novelty and robustness by taking a limit.
Deducibility is too strong
I end this Section by turning to another traditional criticism of reduction as deduction: not (as above) that it is too weak and further constraints need to be imposed, but that it is too strong. Not only do I feel duty-bound by tradition to report this criticism. Also, since it weakens the concept of reduction, it makes cases of emergence and reduction easier to come by-grist to my mill.
The criticism is that definitional extension, and thereby proposals like Nagel's that incorporate it (and any variants that keeps his clause (i), only adjusting his (ii)), is too strong for reduction. (This objection is made by e.g. Kemeny and Oppenheim (1956), and Feyerabend (1962) .) For in many cases where T b reduces T t , T b corrects, rather than implies, T t . One standard example is Newtonian gravitation theory (T b ) and Galileo's law of free fall (T t ). This T t says that bodies near the earth fall with constant acceleration. This T b says that as they fall, their acceleration increases, albeit by a tiny amount. But surely T b reduces T t . And similarly in many famous and familiar examples of reduction in physics: wave optics corrects geometric optics, relativistic mechanics corrects Newtonian mechanics etc.
This objection puts limiting relations between theories centre-stage: which I have postponed to the companion paper. So here it will suffice to make two general points.
(1): Nagel himself replied that indeed a case in which T t 's laws are a close approxima-tion to what strictly follows from T b should count as reduction. He called this 'approximative reduction ' (1979, pp. 361-363, 371-373) . Compare also Hempel (1965, p. 344-346; 1966, pp. 75-77) . In a similar vein, Schaffner (1967, p. 144; 1976, p. 618 ) requires a strong analogy between T t and its corrected version, i.e. what strictly follows from T b ). Sadly, the literature seems not to notice these long-past replies to Kemeny et al. (e.g. Needham 2010 , Section 5).
Against these replies, critics have complained that it is too programmatic, since it gives no general account of when an approximation or analogy is close enough. But in Nagel's and Schaffner's defence, I would say that (a) we should not expect, and (b) we do not need, any such general account.
11 This is in line with both: (i) my scepticism about a single best concept of reduction, or of emergence (Sections 1.1.2 and 1.1.3); and (ii) my swings-androundabouts moral about exactly which theory to consider (end of Section 3.1). What matters, both scientifically and conceptually, is that in a given case we can deduce that T t 's proposition (whether a description of particular fact, or a general theorem/law) is approximately true; and that we can quantify how good the approximation is.
(2): This allowance that in reduction, T b need only imply an approximation, or "cousin" of T t , corrected by the lights of T b , fits well with a central claim of the companion paper. There I will not only claim that in some examples, novel and robust behaviour is rigorously deducible in some limit of a parameter, say N = ∞: showing emergence and reduction. I will also claim that often there is a weaker sense of 'novel and robust behaviour' which, even with the parameter N finite, can be deduced. This weak sense is often the idea just discussed: i.e. a matter of approximate cousins, especially coarse-grained versions, of the properties (especially, physical quantities and states) that are exactly defined, and deducible, at the N = ∞ limit. And though these cousins are approximate, they can be accurate to several significant figures! Finally, mention of significant figures prompts the following remark. I have emphasized the power of deduction to justify T t as approximately true by the lights of T b . But I should register the importance for heuristics of computer simulations (especially given the rise of computational physics). In particular, computer simulations of T b (or models of T b ) with finite N often show, regardless of deduction, the approximate behaviour characteristic of T t -and often the approximation is very accurate. Besides, the deduction/simulation distinction is not so sharp; (so nor is the justification/discovery distinction). For: (i) as discussed already in Section 1.1.3, to secure a deduction we must often adopt an approximation scheme-whose warrant is sometimes a simulation; and (ii) we often have some sort of error-analysis of our computer simulation, which justifies, at least partially, its accuracy.
The philosophical tradition about supervenience
For the rest of this paper, I turn to the relation between emergence and supervenience. As mentioned at the end of Section 2.1, the philosophical tradition is that supervenience is a weakening of Section 3.1's notion of definitional extension: namely, by allowing definitions that are infinitely long, as well as finitely long. Since definitional extension is the core idea of Nagelian reduction, this tradition prompted the proposal that emergence is "mere supervenience", i.e. supervenience using at least one infinitely long definition. Since the 1970s this proposal, together with the idea of multiple realizability ((5) of Section 3.1.1) has dominated philosophical discussion of emergence, and more generally of the relations between the special sciences and physics.
I deny the proposal: I will present examples of supervenience without emergence, and vice versa. Agreed, the proposal is nowadays not as popular as it was in the 1970s and 1980s (for reasons reviewed in Section 4.1). But my reasons for denying it are different from those in this debate's literature; and, I submit, more conclusive! Furthermore, my reasons expose two widespread faults of this literature. So it will be worth spelling out my reasons, and the faults they reveal. In this Section, I discuss the philosophical tradition about supervenience as infinitary definitional extension. Then in Section 5, I give my own reasons to deny the proposal, and I also expose the faults in the literature. Section 4.1 begins with the core idea of supervenience. This will lead to multiple realizability and supervenience as infinitary definition. This prompts the proposal that emergence is mere supervenience (Section 4.2). Section 4.3 describes how objections to Section 4.1's definition of the core idea prompt one to consider global superveniencewhich will lead in to Section 5's denial of the proposal.
Supervenience, multiple realizability and infinity
Supervenience is normally introduced as follows. One envisages a set O of objects, on which are defined two sets of properties, say B and T ; (again, 'B' for 'bottom' and 'T ' for 'top'). One says that T supervenes on B, or is implicitly defined by B, (with respect to O), iff any two objects in O that match in all properties in B also match in all properties in T . Or equivalently, with the contrapositive: any two objects that differ in a property in T must also differ in some property or other in B. One also says that B subvenes T .
There are some standard vivid examples-which are persuasive, though of course (this being philosophy!) controvertible.
(1): Let O be the set of human actions, T their moral properties (e.g. 'is a generous action'), and B their natural properties (e.g. 'is a transfer of money to a poor relation'). (This example seems to have been first discussed by G.E. Moore and Hare, who introduced the word 'supervenience' into philosophy.) (2): Let O be the set of pictures, T their aesthetic properties (e.g. 'is well-composed'), and B their physical properties (e.g. 'has magenta in top-left corner').
(3): Let O be the set of sentient animals, T their mental properties (e.g. 'sees an edge in top-left visual field'), and B their physical properties (e.g. 'has an an active edge-detector cell in the visual cortex').
These examples and others like them bring out the idea of multiple realizability: that the instances in O of a property P ∈ T are very varied as regards their properties in B. We say that P is 'multiply realized' with respect to B; (other jargon: the instances are 'heterogeneous').
The idea of multiple realizability has been developed in a broadly "anti-reductionist" direction, in two main ways. The first, called the 'multiple realizability argument against reductionism', is informal (Section 4.1.1). The second is formal, in that it appeals to the idea of infinity (Section 4.1.2). I will use the first as a spring-board to briefly discuss the philosophical issues about explanation etc. in reduction which I postponed in the preamble of Section 3. But (true to my enthusiasm for reduction!) I will cite what I believe is a definitive refutation of the argument. Then I go on to emphasise the second way, the appeal to infinity. For it is this which leads to the proposal that emergence just is supervenience-which I take up in Section 4.2.
The multiple realizability argument
This argument returns us to topics like explanation, property-identity and laws. It goes, roughly, as follows. At least in some examples, the instances of P are so varied that even if there is an extensionally correct definition of P in terms of B, it will be so long and-or disjunctive and-or heterogeneous that:
(a): explanations of singular propositions about instance of P cannot be given in terms of B, whatever might be the details about the laws and singular propositions involving B; (similarly, if one conceives explanations in terms of events or occurrences: a theory using B cannot give an explanation of a singular occurrence of P ); and-or; (b): P cannot be a natural kind, and-or cannot be a law-like or projectible property, and-or cannot enter into a law, from the perspective of B.
Usually an advocate of (a) or (b) is not "eliminativist", but rather "anti-reductionist". P and the other properties in T satisfying (a) and-or (b) are not to be eliminated as a cognitively useless, albeit conveniently short, facon de parler. Rather, we should accept the taxonomy they represent, and thereby the legitimacy of explanations and laws invoking them. Probably the most influential advocates have been: Putnam (1975) for version (a), with the vivid example of a square peg fitting a square hole, but not a circular one; and Fodor (1974) for version (b), with the vivid example of P = being money.
I believe that Sober (1999) has definitively refuted this argument, in its various versions, whether based on (a) or on (b), and without needing to make contentious assumptions about topics like explanation, natural kind and law of nature. As he shows, it is instead the various versions of the argument that make contentious assumptions! I will not go into details: even apart from my agreeing with Sober, discussing these topics and assumptions about them would take up too much space. (But I recommend Shapiro (2000) and Papineau (2010) .) Suffice it to make three points, by way of summarizing Sober's refutation. The first two correspond to rebutting (a) and (b); the third point is broader and arises from the second.
As to (a): the anti-reductionist's favoured explanations in terms of T do not preclude the truth and importance of explanations in terms of B. As to (b): a disjunctive definition of P , and other such disjunctive definitions of properties in T , is no bar to a deduction of a law, governing P and other such properties in T , from a theory T b about the properties in B. Nor is it a bar to this deduction being an explanation of the law.
The last sentence of this refutation of (b) returns us to the question raised in Section 3.2.1 whether to require reduction to obey further constraints apart from deduction. The tradition, in particular Nagel himself, answers Yes. Nagel in effect required that the definiens play a role in the reducing theory T b . In particular, it cannot be a very heterogeneous disjunction. (Recall: the definiens is the right-hand-side of a bridge principle. A common ontological, rather than linguistic, jargon is: P 's subvenient or basal property.) The final sentence of the last paragraph conflicts with this view. At least, it conflicts if this view motivates the non-disjunctiveness requirement by saying that non-disjunctiveness is needed if the reducing theory T b is to explain the laws of reduced theory T t . But I reply: so much the worse for the view. Sober puts this reply as a rhetorical question (1999, p. 552) : 'Are we really prepared to say that the truth and lawfulness of the higher-level generalization is inexplicable, just because the ... derivation is peppered with the word 'or' ?' I agree with him: of course not! I should also mention another response to the definiens being a disjunction: viz. to treat each disjunct separately. That is: some philosophers propose that each disjunct should be taken to be a definition, and so to provide a deduction, valid for a limited domain-roughly speaking, the set of objects to which the disjunct applies. Each of these deductions is conceptually unified in a way that the deduction using the disjunctive definition is not. So following the tradition described in Section 3.2.1, these philosophers say that here we have local reductions, but no global reduction.
I need have no quarrel with this response. As I have emphasized, there is surely no single best sense of 'reduction'. And a stronger sense along these lines, requiring nondisjunctiveness, will unquestionably make for reductions narrower in scope. What really matters, scientifically and philosophically, is to assess, in any given scientific field, just which such reductions hold good, and how narrow they in fact turn out to be. Cf. also tions, and to emergence: cf. e.g. (2002, pp. 74-76, 134-135) , (2005, pp. 236, 239, 243), (2006, pp. 891, 894, 900, 903), (2008, pp. 19-21) , (2009, pp. 23-25) ; and (2) that some singular limits are physically real (2002, p. 56; 2005, pp. 235-236; 2008, p. 19 ). Rueger also advocates view (1) (2000, p. 308; 2006, pp. 344-345) . I call the views (1) and (2) 'important' since in the companion paper (2011), I will disagree! Sober (1999, pp. 558-559) .
I mention this response partly because it has been much discussed by metaphysicians as regards the mind-body relation, often using 'pain' as the property P ∈ T . Thus Kim, perhaps the most tenacious and prolific critic of the multiple realizability argument for non-reductive materialism, argues that if pain is disjunctive, 'it is not the sort of property in terms of which laws can be formulated', and 'multiple local reductions, rather than global reductions, are the rule ' (1992: 16, 20) . (Cf. also many other works e.g. Kim (1999, p. 138; 2005 pp. 24-26, 110-112) .) Nagel (1965, p. 340, pp. 351-352) , is an early statement of this response. No doubt this response seems more plausible, the greater the conceptual disparity between the families of properties ("levels") T and B. In particular, it seems plausible for pain with its "raw feel" contrasted with e.g. neurophysiological properties. Recall the tower of levels mentioned in (ii) of comment (5) on functional definitions in Section 3.1.1.
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So much by way of discussing the multiple realizability argument. I turn to the second, more formal, way in which multiple realization has been used to support "antireductionism".
Infinite variety
Some philosophers make the idea of multiple realizability more precise in terms of infinity. They say that, on any exact definitions of O, T , B (in the example at issue-moral, aesthetic, mental etc.), there are properties P ∈ T with no finite definition in terms of B. That is: for at least one such P , there are infinitely many B-ways to have P , that are exemplified in O.
This meshes well with our original definition of supervenience. For one can argue that the definition is equivalent to an infinitary analogue of definitional extension: in which one allows a definiens used in giving a definitional extension to be infinitely long. The idea of allowing an infinite sequence of compounding operations is at first sight mind-stretching; and one worries that technical obstacles, even paradoxes, may be lurking. But if one takes as one's stock of operations, just the logical operations-the case on which the logic and metaphysics literature have concentrated-the idea is well understood. And for this equivalence, one needs "only" the idea of an infinite disjunction, as follows. Suppose that supervenience as I defined it holds. Then for each property P ∈ T , one can construct a definition of P (as applied to O) by taking the disjunction of the complete descriptions in terms of B of all the objects in O that instantiate P . This disjunction will indeed be infinite if there are infinitely many ways objects can combine properties in B while possessing P . But in any case, supervenience will ensure that objects matching in their complete Bdescriptions match as regards P . So the disjunctive definiens is indeed coextensive with P .
Terminology: in the light of this equivalence, philosophers sometimes call supervenience 'infinitary reduction'. Here 'infinitary' means 'infinite or finite', and 'reduction' just connotes 'definitional extension': no further constraints (e.g. Nagel's (ii), Section 3.2.1), or subvenient properties being non-disjunctive) are required.
This equivalence prompted the proposal that "mere supervenience", i.e. a reduction with at least one P ∈ T having an infinite definition in terms of B, captures the relation between T and B that appears to be common across the examples (1) to (3): a relation where T is autonomous from, yet also grounded in or underpinned by, B.
This proposal was widely endorsed in the 1970s and 1980s. Of course the proposal was not specific to these examples, and philosophers differed about which cases exemplified it. In particular, philosophers of science were mostly unconcerned with the moral and aesthetic examples (1) and (2), and focussed on (3). More generally, they endorsed the proposal as giving the key relation between a special science and fundamental science. That is: for many philosophers, mere supervenience seemed to capture the way a special science such as psychology (or better: a specific theory in such a science) was autonomous from, yet also grounded in, a basic science such as physics (or better: a specific theory in it, such as the physical theory of the brain). I have not yet used the word 'emergence' in this connection, but of course many discussions did. Agreed, they often construed 'emergence' differently from my construal using novel and robust properties or behaviour. (Often, they used causal notions: e.g. properties in T had to be causally efficacious.) Thus the proposal was that emergence (maybe construed differently from me) is mere supervenience. From now on, this proposal will be my main focus-and target.
Is emergence mere supervenience?
One attractive feature of this proposal is evident from the multiple realizability argument; i.e. from the controversies about the role of explanation, property-identity etc. in reduction. Namely, the proposal promises to cut through these controversies with the sharp distinction between finitude and infinity. In short, it suggests:
(i): If T t is a finite definitional extension of T b -each definiens finite, be it ever so long-then there is reduction; and on the other hand:
(ii): if at least one definition is infinite, i.e. there is mere supervenience, then there is emergence.
I have been anti-essentialist about the meanings of the words 'reduction' and 'emergence', and have for the most part conceived reduction in terms of definitional extension. These views, and the promising feature just mentioned, of course incline one to endorse the proposal. But I claim that it is false.
In part, my reasons against the proposal are just endorsements of points made in the literature since the late 1980s; and so they apply to the proposal using construals of emergence different from mine. But I also have reasons of my own, which are specific to my construal of emergence as novel and robust behaviour, and are (say I!) conclusive. So to save space and avoid repetition, I will not go into detail about my endorsements of others' points, but will concentrate on my own reasons. As I mentioned in this Section's preamble, these reasons have the further significance (say I!) of revealing two faults which are widespread in the literature.
So the overall plan of battle for the rest of the paper is as follows. Think of the proposal as a pair of implications, from mere supervenience to emergence and vice versa: I will deny both implications.
(1): In Section 5.2.1, I will deny the first implication: I will give cases of mere supervenience without emergence (i.e. without novel properties). These cases are built on a theorem of logic (Beth's theorem) reviewed in Section 5.1, that has been neglected in the philosophical literature. And this neglect is the literature's first error: for the theorem collapses the proposal's crucial notion of mere supervenience! To explain this, we need to be more precise about how to define supervenience than my original definition, at the start of this Subsection, was. Section 4.3 will begin by improving the definition, and this will lead us back (in Section 5.1) to supervenience's being equivalent to infinitary definitional extension, and thereby to Beth's theorem and the collapse.
(2): Finally, on the other hand: in Section 5.2.2, I will deny the second implication. That is, I will give cases of emergence (i.e. novel and robust behaviour) without mere supervenience. These cases will reveal the second fault: a tendency to wrongly endorse a supervenience thesis of micro-reductionism.
But first, I should close this Subsection by reporting one of the recent literature's main reasons (which I endorse) against the proposal that emergence is mere supervenience. For this reason is independent of Section 4.3's improving the definition of supervenience. And more important, it connects my position about emergence to a widespread current tendency to take supervenience as a necessary condition of emergence, and then propose further conditions. (I mentioned this tendency in Section 1.1: the proposed further conditions include ideas like computational intractability and paradigms like cellular automata.)
The reason is essentially that because mere supervenience is a formal relation, it is compatible with various different conceptions of how properties in T are related to properties in B: that they are wholly different from those in B though correlated with certain (infinitary) compounds of them, or that they are such compounds, or that they are to be eliminated in favour of such compounds. Indeed, this compatibility claim is very familiar, for both the case of morality and of mentality (examples (1) and (3) at the start of Section 4.1). And it is familiar for finitary definitional extension as much as for infinitary (i.e. as for mere supervenience). Thus in moral philosophy, Moore adopted the first "realist" conception I just listed: moral properties supervene on, but are wholly different from, natural properties; while Hare, on the other hand, was an "irrealist". To see the claim in a bit more detail, consider the case of mentality, and a finite explicit definition of a mental predicate P in terms of physical ones, i.e. a statement that P is co-extensive with a physical predicate (no doubt a very complex one). And let us use the jargon of possible worlds; so we suppose the co-extension is non-accidental, i.e. it holds in each of a "large" class of possible worlds. These suppositions still leave open the question whether there is an identity of properties. This is so even if the co-extension is "nomic" in some sense, e.g. holding in all worlds that have the same laws of nature as the actual world. And some would say that property-identity is not settled even by necessary equivalence, i.e. by coextension in all metaphysically possible worlds. (Discussions pressing this compatibility claim as showing that supervenience settles little include: Horgan (1993, pp. 560-566) , Stalnaker (1996, pp. 222-225) , Kim (1998, p. 9; 2006, pp. 555-556) and Crane (2010, p. 26, p. 28) .)
For my topic of emergence, the significance of this compatibility claim is that while philosophers differ about how to use 'emergence', each expects it to provide some unified conception of the relation between the families of properties T and B that goes beyond metaphors like 'autonomy but groundedness'. So since rival conceptions like those of Moore and Hare can be combined with mere supervenience, it surely cannot fit the bill. Hence the search, by philosophers intent on a general characterization of emergence, for other conditions: usually mere supervenience is seen as a necessary condition, and the search is for further conditions. Some proposals appeal to the ideas of the British emergentist Broad (van Cleve (1990, p. 222f.; McLaughlin (1997, pp. 90-96) ), or are reminiscent of his configurational forces mentioned in footnote 9 (Humphreys 1997, Section 5, pp. 117-121) . Some proposals appeal to the ideas and paradigms (i) and (ii) listed in Section 1.1.3. And some proposals appeal to singular limits (cf. Batterman's and Rueger's view (1) in footnote 12).
My own response to this tendency in the literature is as I said in Section 1.1.3. I agree that emergence is not supervenience, though for reasons of my own (Section 5.2). And I am not essentialist about how to use 'emergence'; so I can be pluralist and accept that, for example, computational intractability in cellular automata, gives an acceptable sense of 'emergence'. (This example is-in shortest possible form!-Bedau's proposal. Humphreys suggests a friendly amendment (2008, pp. 435-437, thesis 2); a concordant scientific result, about modelling phase transitions, is Gu, Weedbrook et al. (2008) .) More specifically, in the companion paper's four examples of emergence and reduction in physics, the emergence turns on taking a limit of some parameter. So again, taking such a limit may also give an acceptable sense.
Relations and possibilia: local vs. global supervenience
I now start on the plan of battle announced in Section 4.2. I begin with two related objections to Section 4.1's opening definition of supervenience.
(i): The definition mentions properties, and matching in them, but not relations with two or more argument-places. But surely we should include relations, and somehow make sense of objects o 1 , o 2 ∈ O matching in them? Indeed, Section 4.1's opening examples (1) to (3) support this, especially if we think of properties as intrinsic. The moral properties of an action surely depend on a wide array of relations it has to other items; similarly, the mental properties of an animal (as in theories of wide content, in the philosophy of mind); and similarly, the aesthetic properties of a picture.
(ii): Supervenience's conditional, 'if o 1 , o 2 match as regards B, they match as regards T ' is usually taken, for simplicity, as a mere material conditional. But then, for the obvious choices of the set O as actual objects, the antecedent will very likely be false, and supervenience will be merely vacuously true. For example, it is very likely that no two actual pictures match in their physical properties; even allowing for photographs and forgeries, there will be invisible, at least microscopic, differences.
These two objections support each other in the obvious way: including relations, as (i) suggests will make matching even rarer, aggravating (ii).
Both these objections can be met, at least for the most part, by a common response which we might call 'going modal'. Suppose first that we take O to contain not just actual objects (of a given sort: actions, pictures etc.) but also possible objects. That should answer (ii): for surely, there could be two actions (or pictures, or animals) that were atom-for-atom duplicates of each other, either both in the same possible world or in two different worlds. (A supervenience claim that considers trans-world, as well as intraworld, matching as regards B will be stronger than one that only considers intra-world matching.) But once modality is in play, it is natural to suggest that we take O to contain possible worlds, i.e. extended, indeed global, possible states of affairs (patterns of fact), so that supervenience is about the matching of entire worlds as regards the description of their objects by both properties and relations. That should answer (i): considering all the various objects in a world will ensure that we allow for P ∈ T depending on a wide array of B-relations.
This suggests that we formulate supervenience along the following lines, using a set of possible worlds O:
For all worlds w, w ′ ∈ O: if w, w ′ match as regards the descriptions of their objects by the properties and relations in B, then they also match as regards the descriptions of their objects by the properties and relations in T .
Here one envisages that worlds matching as regards the description of their objects will be made precise in terms of isomorphism (a bijection between the worlds' sets of inhabitants that preserves properties and relations); or more metaphysically, in terms of duplicate worlds.
Some jargon (due to Kim (1984) ): taking the set O to contain possible worlds is often called global supervenience, while taking O to contain objects (actual and-or possible) is local supervenience. Of course, different authors' formulations vary somewhat; even for a single choice of O as e.g. all worlds sharing the actual world's laws of nature. For example: (i) as regards global supervenience, formulations vary about whether the same bijection must be used for the T -isomorphism as for the B-isomorphism; and (ii) as regards local supervenience, formulations vary about whether to consider trans-world matching of objects. Discussions covering (i) and (ii) include: Kim (1984); Teller (1984, pp. 140-146) ; Lewis (1986, pp. 14-17) ; Stalnaker (1993, p. 225-230); Chalmers (1996, pp. 411-413) .
For philosophers not sceptical of modality, global supervenience formulated along these lines is at least as plausible as local supervenience, i.e. object-object supervenience: (including the (stronger) trans-world version of local supervenience). In particular, it does not imply object-object supervenience, even in the weaker intra-world version: (nor therefore can it imply its strengthening, the trans-world version). For global supervenience allows that two objects in a world, w say, match each other as regards B, but not T , and so violate object-object supervenience-provided this violation is duplicated in worlds that duplicate w.
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Besides, almost all philosophers, even if sceptical of modality, accept the framework of classical semantics; and that framework suffices to state global supervenience very precisely-cf. the next Section.
Emergence as mere supervenience? No!
With Section 4's review in hand, I can now give my own reasons for denying that emergence is mere supervenience. As I announced in the preamble to Section 4, this will also expose two faults in the literature. In Section 5.1, I will make precise Section 4.3's notion of global supervenience. Then I point to the fact that a theorem in logic, Beth's theorem, collapses the distinction between supervenience thus defined and traditional, i.e. finitary, definitional extension-under widely endorsed assumptions. Neglecting this theorem is the first of the two faults I see in the literature: the importance of the theorem for this debate was pointed out by Hellman and Thompson already in 1975 . Finally in Section 5.2, I present examples of supervenience without emergence, and vice versa. This rebuts the proposal and completes my argument for the logical independence of emergence, supervenience and reduction. It will also expose a second fault of the literature: a tendency to wrongly endorse a supervenience thesis, about the macroscopic supervening on the microscopic, as true, when in fact it is crucially vague-and one salient precise version of the thesis is clearly false. Exposing this second fault will also return us to points [1] and [2] at the end of Section 3.1.
Supervenience often collapses into reduction
Section 5.1.1 will state Section 4.3's notion of global supervenience in terms of classical semantics or model theory. This will lead to the collapse to definitional extension, and thus to comparison with Section 3's topic of reduction; (Section 5.1.2). 
Global supervenience made precise
Thus recall that a formal language L has a non-logical vocabulary, which for simplicity we can take to comprise only predicates. That is: we suppose we have eliminated names and function-symbols in terms of predicates using Russell's theory of descriptions (cf. (3) of Section 3. 1.1) . (This tactic is merely for simplicity: by construing 'definition' in a more cumbersome way, i.e. by disjunctively treating predicates, names and function-symbols as three separate cases, we could avoid it; cf. e.g. Boolos and Jeffrey (1980, p. 246) .) We envisage that L's set of predicates is the union B ∪ T of the disjoint sets B and T . Among the interpretations, I, J etc., of the language, we define in the usual way two relations: isomorphism, written I ∼ = J; and restriction to a sub-vocabulary, written I| B , J| T etc. (Similarly, we will write L| B , L| T .)
Now suppose we are given a class α of interpretations of L. Then there are two salient relations between B and T , relative to the class α.
(Exp): Explicit definability: For each predicate P ∈ T , of polyadicity n, there is an open sentence φ(x 1 , ..., x n ) in L, with only predicates in B and with n free variables, such that every interpretation I ∈ α makes true the universally quantified biconditional, i.e. the statement of coextension: (∀x 1 )...(∀x n )(P (x 1 , ..., x n ) ≡ φ(x 1 , ..., x n )). The threatened collapse of supervenience into reduction will turn on the fact that (Exp) and (Imp) are provably equivalent-under widely endorsed assumptions. This is Beth's theorem. But let us first comment on their respective relations to our previous discussions.
(Exp) returns us to Section 3's notion of reduction. For the set of (Exp)'s biconditionals is of course the set D of judiciously chosen definitions in terms of which (3) of Section 3.1 defined T t being a definitional extension of T b . To spell out the connection more precisely, we need the idea of extensionality, as follows.
Recall that the principle of extensionality, applied to an n-place predicate P , says the following. Suppose that in an interpretation I, P is coextensive with an n-place open sentence φ, i.e. I makes true the universally quantified biconditional (∀x 1 )...(∀x n )(P (x 1 , ..., x n ) ≡ φ(x 1 , ..., x n )). Let Ψ(P ) be any formula containing P and let Ψ(φ) be the formula obtained from Ψ(P ) by everywhere substituting φ for P (with the corresponding argumentvariables). Then I also makes true Ψ(P ) ≡ Ψ(φ). In short, as a rule of inference: From (∀x 1 )...(∀x n )(P (x 1 , ..., x n ) ≡ φ(x 1 , ..., x n )), infer Ψ(P ) ≡ Ψ(φ).
So suppose now that L is an extensional language; (as Hellman and Thompson, and Beth's theorem, explicitly assume; as do many philosophical discussions of reduction, though often implicitly by referring to 'formalized languages', 'first-order languages' with-out further details). Let D be a set of biconditionals, defining each P ∈ T in terms of B, as in (Exp). And for any theory (indeed: mere set) T of formulas of L, let T D be obtained from T by everywhere substituting for each P ∈ T its definition φ, as given by the set D of definitions. So formulas in T D contain no predicates P ∈ T ; they are in the language L| B . T D is sometimes called a definitional equivalent of T ; and similarly for formulas in T . Then, by extensionality: among the (interpretations of L that are) models of D, any interpretation making true T also makes true T D ; and vice versa. In the usual notation, writing Ψ for any formula of T and Ψ D for its definitional equivalent: D |= Ψ ≡ Ψ D . In particular, this applies to T := T t . So for any Ψ ∈ T t : D |= Ψ ≡ Ψ D .
Now we can return to our original concern: the assertion that T t is a definitional extension of T b . In Section 3.1 this was defined in terms of derivability, i.e. syntactic consequence. But assuming the underlying logic is complete, we can instead use semantic consequence, so that the assertion is that
Of course, logic alone cannot guarantee that for a given choice of T (and so B as the rest of L's non-logical vocabulary), and of T t and T b , there is a set D of definitions of all P ∈ T , such that D, T b |= T t .
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Turning to (Imp), it clearly expresses the idea of global supervenience. But I should notice two wrinkles in relation to Hellman and Thompson's discussion. First, their definition (1975, p.559 ) uses identity, not isomorphism, of models: '=' not ' ∼ ='; (as do other treatments, e.g. Boolos and Jeffrey (1980, p. 246) ). My (Imp) uses isomorphism in order to fit better with our informal motivation, that global supervenience is about two possible worlds' matching as regards a set of properties or predicates. But as they remark (their footnote 14), the two definitions are equivalent if α is closed under automorphic images: which it will be in the cases relevant to the collapse of supervenience to reduction, i.e. in the cases covered by Beth's theorem.
Second, Hellman and Thompson also discuss a second version of global supervenience, in effect concerning truth rather reference. So they call (Imp) 'reference-determination' and their other version 'truth-determination'; (viz. their (4), p. 558, using the relation between interpretations of elementary equivalence, i.e. two interpretations making the same sentences true). But I can ignore this second version; partly because, for the cases that mostly concern us (including the collapse of supervenience into reduction), α is the class of models of a theory-and for such α, (Imp) implies this second version (as Hellman and Thompson note, p. 560).
The collapse: Beth's theorem
I turn to the implications between (Exp) and (Imp), for the case where the set of interpretations α is a theory-class, i.e. the set of models of some theory T , and the language L is first-order, finitary (i.e. has finitely many predicates, and finitely long formulas) and extensional. Then (Exp) implies (Imp). Agreed, since the definitions D in (Exp) evidently fix the extensions of P ∈ T , this implication is unsurprising; and it is straightforward to show (e.g. Boolos and Jeffrey 1980, p. 247-248) . Of course, this implication fosters the philosophical tradition that supervenience is a weakening of reduction; (as did Section 4.1.2's equivalence of local supervenience with possibly-infinite disjunction).
But the converse is also true: (Imp) implies (Exp). This is surprising, and is hard to show. It is Beth's theorem (1953) . It depends on the compactness theorem and Craig's interpolation lemma; (cf. Boolos and Jeffrey (1980, p. 248-249) , Mostowski (1966, p. 127) ). This dependence also means there is no limit to how long or complicated the explicit definitions are. Here, of course, lies a way of reconciling Beth's theorem with Section 4.1's opening intuition that aesthetic properties of pictures, or mental properties of animals, supervene on, but are not definable from, their physical properties. Namely: if a definition is allowed to be a billion pages long (or much longer!), nobody can be so sure that there is none! In the light of this equivalence of (Exp) and (Imp), there are two obvious broad tactics available to someone seeking to define some relation of dependence, between a theory that is 'higher-level' or part of a 'special science', and a 'lower-level' or 'fundamental' theory, that is weaker than reduction.
First, one can accept the equivalence, but argue, as in Section 3.2.1 and the multiple realizability argument of Section 4.1.1, that reduction is stronger than deducibility, i.e. stronger than (Exp) above. Thus (Exp), equivalently (Imp), define the weaker relation that is sought: deducibility indeed, though perhaps with definitions a billion pages long. Second, one can deny that the assumptions of the equivalence-that α is a theory-class, and L first-order, finitary and extensional-apply to the philosophical or logical description of scientific theories and their relations: so that one can still advocate (Imp) as the sought-for relation.
The second tactic is the one that Hellman and Thompson (1975, pp. 562-563) adopt. They recall that in order to articulate global supervenience (of one theory's, or science's, taxonomy or set of predicates, on another's), the set α must represent some sort of scientific possibility (cf. Section 4.3's motivations for 'going modal'); and they point out that there is good reason to deny that this α is a theory-class. For since Gödel's 1931 incompleteness theorem, modern logic has taught us that most formalized theories (in particular, first-order finitary theories rich enough to contain arithmetic) have nonstandard models. Since it is reasonable to exclude such models, i.e. to insist on certain predicates receiving their standard interpretations (either up to isomorphism of models, or yet more finely), it is reasonable to deny that the set of scientifically possible structures is a theory-class (for theories with such non-standard models).
It is clear that for my purposes, I do not need to decide between these two tactics. As to the first tactic, recall Section 3.1's celebration of the power of deduction, and its anti-essentialism about reduction, i.e. indifference as to how to use the word 'reduction', and its alleged contraries like 'emergence'. So I can concur with someone who reserves 'reduction' for short and simple deductions, using short and unified definitions, and who suggests the weaker concept of deduction tout court-maybe long and complicated-as the more general dependence between higher-level and lower-level theories.
As to the second tactic, I of course endorse Hellman and Thompson's point that for Gödelian reasons, the set of scientifically possible structures is not a theory-class for a first-order, finitary extensional theory. This leaves the way open for them to advocate (Imp) as the desired weaker-than-reduction relation-which they proceed to do in another paper (1977) . I will not assess their position in full. (In any case, a recent discussion by Hellman (2010, Section 4) suggests that like me, he could also endorse the first tactic.) But in the next Section, I will argue for my own main claim, announced in Section 4.2: that emergence in my sense, and supervenience-now meaning global supervenience, i.e. (Imp)-are independent. 18 5.2 Supervenience without emergence, and vice versa I turn to my four cases of logical independence: E&S, E&¬S, ¬E&S and ¬E&¬S. As discussed already in (ii) of Section 2.2, the first and fourth cases are already established. That is: assuming as usual that reduction implies supervenience, any case of E&R (secured by Section 3 and the companion paper) is a case of E&S. And two theories about two unrelated topics will give cases of ¬E&¬S. So I only need to consider the second and third cases: E&¬S and ¬E&S.
But as explained in Section 4.2, I will argue for these cases in the more interesting sense that I will deny the proposal that all and only cases of mere supervenience, i.e. supervenience-but-not-reduction, are cases of emergence. The 'all' claim is false: S&¬R does not imply E, so that (S&¬R)&¬E is possible. Section 5.2.1 will give three cases, thanks to Hellman and Thompson. Their third case reveals a fault in the literature; which will be relevant in Section 5.2.2's demonstration that the 'only' claim is false: E does not imply S&¬R, so that E&¬(S&¬R), i.e. E&(¬S ∨ R), is possible. Hellman and Thompson (1977, Section 2) give three examples of supervenience without reduction. I shall argue that all three involve no emergence in my sense. For all I know, my claim involves no disagreement with Hellman and Thompson. Though they sometimes mention emergence, it is not their focus-they aim rather to articulate physicalism as supervenience (which they call 'determination') without reduction. In particular, they do not construe emergence as novel and robust behaviour: a construal on which my claim will turn.
Supervenience without emergence or reduction
Their first two examples are adapted from theorems about formal systems of arithmetic. But since almost any formalized physical theory is likely to contain a version of arithmetic, the examples could no doubt be adapted to apply to physics. In any case, the first example is based on a renowned theorem (Tarski's indefinability theorem), and it leads in to the second example; so I will concentrate on the first. The third example is just a sketch, about statistical mechanics. But it will teach us a moral that will also apply in Section 5.2.2.
(1): Tarski's indefinability theorem: This theorem says that the set of Gödel numbers of sentences true in the standard model of arithmetic is not definable in arithmetic; (for definitions and a proof, cf. e.g. Boolos and Jeffrey 1980, p. 173-177) . So consider a (firstorder) theory T of arithmetic in a language L; so L contains symbols for zero, successor, addition and multiplication. Extend T by adding: (i) a one-place predicate T r; and (ii) for each sentence S of L that is true in the standard model of arithmetic, with Gödel number n(S), an axiom 'T r(n(S)) ≡ S'. Call the extended theory T * . Then Tarski's theorem says that T r is not explicitly definable in T . But on the other hand: taking α as the class of standard ω-models of T * , T r is implicitly definable in terms of L's vocabulary (symbols for zero, successor etc.) relative to α. For evidently: once the reference of L's arithmetic vocabulary is fixed, so is the reference of 'true-in-arithmetic'.
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So much by way of summarizing Hellman and Thompson's (1977, p. 312 ) first example. Now I simply add that (by my lights at least!) T r does not represent a novel property, across the class α of standard ω-models of T * , in comparison with the properties thus expressed using L's vocabulary (using the symbols for zero, successor etc.). Indeed, this denial goes hand in hand with the implicit definability of T r, i.e. the fact that once the reference of L's vocabulary is fixed, so is the reference of 'true-in-arithmetic'. (Of course, I intend this hand-in-hand claim for this example and its ilk, like (2) below: but not as a general claim. I do not think implicit definability excludes novelty-as my later examples of E&R, and so E&S, are meant to attest.) (2): Addison's theorem: The second example is similar to the first. Hellman and Thompson invoke another indefinability theorem, viz. Addison's theorem, to argue that in a natural class of models (though not a theory-class!), a certain predicate is not explicitly definable in terms of certain others, but is implicitly definable.
To state Addison's theorem, we need the notion of a class C of sets of numbers being definable in arithmetic. This means that in the language of arithmetic augmented with a monadic predicate G, there is a formula that is true in the standard model of arithmetic iff G is assigned as its extension one of the sets in the class C. Then Addison's theorem says that the class of sets definable in arithmetic is not definable in arithmetic. That is: there is no formula in L + G that is true in the standard model of arithmetic iff G is assigned as its extension a set of numbers definable in arithmetic; (cf. Boolos and Jeffrey 1980, p. 208 and Chapter 20, p. 217) . In short: the predicate 'is a set of numbers definable in arithmetic' is not itself definable in arithmetic.
Hellman and Thompson then define a natural class of models, that are intuitively the standard models of arithmetic each augmented with the standard interpretation of 'is a set of numbers definable in arithmetic'; (their α C ; 1977, p. 313) . Thus the predicate 'is a set of numbers definable in arithmetic' is implicitly defined by L's vocabulary (the symbols for zero, successor etc.) relative to α C .
As in (1), I of course concur. But I would then add that (by my lights at least!) the predicate does not represent a novel property, across the class α C , in comparison with the properties thus expressed using L's vocabulary. Again, this denial goes hand in hand with the implicit definability of the predicate.
(3): Statistical mechanics: Hellman and Thompson's last example (1977, p. 314 ) is much less formal. It returns us to my example in Section 3.1.2. There my first point was that equilibrium classical statistical mechanics is a definitional extension of the classical mechanics of the microscopic constituents, taken as including Lebesgue measure on phase space and multi-variable calculus. But I stressed that this claim of deducibility is of course sensitive to the exact definitions of the theories concerned: in particular, either statistical mechanics should not include the ergodic hypothesis, or the microscopic theory should contain special assumptions to make the hypothesis deducible.
Hellman and Thompson adapt the same circle of ideas to urge an example of implicit, but not explicit, definability: of supervenience without reduction (definitional extension). They envisage that the microscopic mechanics lacks measure theory, so that the definitional extension is blocked; but then say the macro-concepts of statistical mechanics are determined by the microscopic ones: fix two closed systems of particles identically in micro-respects, and their macro-behaviours will be indistinguishable. Each system will be represented by the same trajectory in phase space. If, therefore, higher entropy regions, say, are entered at given times by one system, the same regions will be entered at those times by the other ... a clear case of determination. (ibid.)
Broadly speaking, I concur: at the cost of considerable labour, one could formalize both the microscopic and the macroscopic concepts and theories, so as to give a rigorous example of implicit, but not explicit, definability. But what about emergence? Admittedly, Section 3.1's eulogy for reduction as deduction urged that there are cases of emergence and reduction: E&R. But that by no means implies that every macroscopic concept, in any rigorous example along the lines indicated, would be emergent. Surely not! Examples (1) and (2) have shown that even elementary arithmetic harbours implicitly, but not explicitly, definable concepts that are not novel. So we can surely find such concepts in the much richer setting of rigorous statistical mechanical examples.
This quotation from Hellman and Thompson reveals the second fault I promised. It turns on the fact that they refer to fixing a system's 'micro-respects', but they do not specify what these properties are. Agreed, that is fair enough when sketching an example. But we should note that countless philosophical discussions of supervenience, emergence and related issues, similarly fail to specify the 'micro-respects' they are concerned with, not just when sketching an example, but in their official statement of doctrine. For example, countless discussions of the supervenience of the mental on the physical (example (3) of Section 4.1) refer to an animal in some physical state, and an 'atom-for-atom replica/duplicate' of the animal: with no precise statement of which properties must match between such replicas. This lacuna might seem a minor matter; or even a judicious openness to whichever properties physics might discover (whether yesterday, today or tomorrow). But it obviously threatens to render supervenience claims trivially true, by the set B of subvening properties or predicates being taken as however large and inclusive as is needed to fix the properties or predicates in T . As we will see in Section 5.2.2, this fault tends to hide cases that are failures of supervenience, including those that are also cases of emergence.
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Finally, it is worth noting that, apart from this philosophical danger of trivializing supervenience, there is a corresponding scientific danger. Namely, complacency about supervenience (or reduction): saying that somehow-we need not care how!-the microscopic properties are defined so as to subvene (or reduce) whatever phenomena we see, however surprising: e.g. superfluidity as in the example at the end of Section 3.1.
Emergence without supervenience or reduction
To complete my argument for the logical independence of emergence, reduction and supervenience, I turn to giving cases of emergence without supervenience or reduction. There will be two sorts of case, [1] and [2] , corresponding to the points [1] and [2] at the end of Section 3.1; (so we have already done most of the work!). Given my over-arching message, about the compatibility of reduction and emergence, it will be no surprise to hear that one sort of case (the second) is counterfactual. So for these cases, I am leaning on my argument being for logical independence, not some sort of nomic independence (cf. Section 2.1). But anyway, the first sort of case is both real and pervasive. supervenience etc. we are concerned with. Besides, I concur that entangled states violate their formulations of supervenience, and yield emergence i.e. novel and robust behaviour.
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Accordingly, these states give cases of emergence without supervenience.
[2]: At the end of Section 3.1, I noted that according to both classical and quantum physics, there are no fundamental forces that come into play only when the number of bodies (or particles, or degrees of freedom) exceeds some number, or when the bodies etc. are in certain states. Indeed, only two-body forces are needed. And I mentioned that McLaughlin (1992) claims that quantum physics' not needing such forces, even for its explanations of chemical and biological phenomena, spelt the end of British emergentism of Broad's stripe. (Just before the rise of quantum chemistry, Broad had conjectured that such forces, which he called 'configurational forces', would be needed to explain such phenomena.) But (here I "go counterfactual"): suppose there were such configurational forces, and that they were needed to explain some chemical or biological phenomenon or phenomena. This supposition is perfectly reasonable: recall from the end of Section 3.1 how Leggett in the 1970s suspected such forces were needed to explain superfluid helium, but then discovered they were not. Reasonable, though false: pace some (surely maverick?) philosophers of chemistry who claim that phenomena such as molecular shape require such forces (e.g. Hendry 2010, Section 3).
On this supposition, then: no matter what the exact details were, we would surely have a second class of cases of emergence without supervenience. For the chemical or biological phenomenon would give the novel and robust behaviour that is emergence. But the need for configurational forces would mean that the phenomenon does not supervene on all the quantum-physical properties and facts that involve only two-body forces; (i.e. the actual properties and facts!).
Here we return to the fault revealed at the end of Section 5.2.1; and the moral it teaches, that a supervenience claim needs to define precisely what properties or predicates are in the subvening set B, on pain of being trivialized by phrases like 'atom-for-atom duplicate' being taken to cover however large and inclusive a set of microscopic properties (Hellman and Thompson's 'micro-respects') as is needed. Thus in the envisaged situation, physics as a discipline would no doubt address itself to developing a quantitative theory of the configurational forces: a theory that would then use the forces to explain the chemical or biological phenomenon. And if this endeavour succeeded, we might well sum up the situation by saying that the phenomenon supervened on, or even was reduced to, the physical. That would be testimony, yet again, to the power of reduction-and perhaps to the elasticity of the word 'physics' ! But that in no way supports the claim that the phenomenon supervenes on the (actual) physics that uses only non-configurational forces-ex hypothesi that claim is false. 
